In the 1924 case Davis v. Pringle, the U.S. Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a federal agent for claims due in operation of Atlantic Coast Line Railroad could recover funds from a trustee in bankruptcy of Boyd Co., Inc.'s estate. The dispute arose when Boyd Co., which had been contracted to perform construction work on the railroad, went bankrupt and its assets were placed under control of a trustee (Pringle). Davis claimed that certain payments made by the railroad company to Boyd Co. prior to its bankruptcy should be returned as they were preferential transfers under Section 60a of Bankruptcy Act - meaning they unfairly favored one creditor over others. The court ruled against Davis, stating that these payments did not constitute preferential transfers because they were made while Boyd Co. was still solvent and thus did not disadvantage other creditors at time it became insolvent later on.

In the dissenting opinion for Davis v. Pringle, it was argued that the majority's decision to allow a federal agent to claim priority in bankruptcy proceedings over other creditors contradicted established legal principles and precedent. The dissent contended that such an interpretation of law would unjustly favor government claims at the expense of private creditors, undermining their rights and protections under bankruptcy law. It was also suggested that this ruling could potentially disrupt commercial transactions by creating uncertainty about creditor priorities in insolvency situations. Furthermore, they disagreed with the majority’s view on how "necessity" should be interpreted within this context; arguing instead for a more restrictive understanding which would limit preferential treatment only to instances where public safety or welfare were directly threatened.