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09-11328 DAVIS V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 598 F.3d 1259 CERT. GRANTED 11/1/2010 QUESTION PRESENTED: In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), this Court created a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment. The Court has expanded the good-faith exception over time, most recently in Herring v. United States, __ U.S.__, 129 S.Ct. 695 (2009). Petitioner asks the Court to resolve a deepening split in the lower courts over whether the good-faith exception applies to changing interpretations of law. The question presented is this: "Whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to a search authorized by precedent at the time of the search that is subsequently ruled unconstitutional." LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 08-16654
In the case of Willie Gene Davis v. United States in 2010, the Supreme Court ruled that a defendant who allows police to search his property cannot later challenge the legality of that search if it is found he did not have legal rights to the premises searched. The decision was based on an incident where Davis had consented to a police search while being arrested for driving with a suspended license. During this search, officers discovered a firearm and subsequently charged him as a felon in possession of it. Davis attempted to suppress this evidence by arguing that his initial arrest was unlawful; however, because he had given consent for the search at the time, regardless of whether or not his arrest was lawful or unlawful, any evidence obtained during such searches could be used against him in court.
In the dissenting opinion for Willie Gene Davis v. United States, Justice Breyer argued that the exclusionary rule should not apply when police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent. He believed that suppressing evidence due to changes in law after the fact does not serve any of the purposes of this rule - deterring future Fourth Amendment violations or preserving judicial integrity. Instead, it punishes officers who acted according to existing legal standards and potentially lets guilty parties go free without advancing constitutional protections. The majority's decision, he contended, would create uncertainty about what constitutes 'binding' precedent and could discourage officers from relying on court rulings at all.