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In Philip H. De Lane, et al v Andrew B. Moore and James L. Goree, Executors of James L. Goree, the appellants argued that they had a right to certain lands in Texas by virtue of an agreement with the deceased owner’s father before his death in 1845. The executors argued that since no deed was executed during the lifetime of either party to this agreement, it could not be enforced against them as executors or administrators after their deaths; thus denying any rights for the appellants over these lands in question. The Supreme Court held that although there was no deed executed between parties while alive, yet if there were sufficient facts proven which would show a contract binding on both sides and capable of being enforced by law then such an agreement should be given effect even though it is not evidenced by writing or other formality required by statute at common law; therefore granting rights for the appellants over these lands in question according to their original agreement with deceased owner's father prior to his death
In the case of Philip H. De Lane, John M. Chiles, Martha C. Chiles, John E. Lykes and Grace A. Lykes v Andrew B Moore and James L Goree Executors of James L Goree (Deceased), the dissenting opinion was that the appellants were entitled to recover from appellees for their damages in relation to a contract made between them concerning certain lands in Texas which had been sold by one party but not conveyed by another as agreed upon in said contract due to an intervening act of Congress prohibiting such conveyance at that time; however, this did not absolve either party from liability under the terms of their agreement since it was impossible for both parties to perform simultaneously what they had promised each other when entering into said agreement - thus making it necessary for one or more parties involved therein to suffer some loss or damage thereby - and therefore held that appellants should be allowed recovery against appellees on account thereof according to equity principles applicable thereto even though no specific remedy therefor may have been provided by law at that time.