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In De Veau v. Braisted (1959), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a New York law that barred convicted felons from holding office in waterfront labor organizations. The case arose when Wilfred De Veau, who had been convicted of felony embezzlement, was elected as an officer in a local longshoremen's union and then challenged the constitutionality of the state law barring him from serving due to his conviction. He argued that it violated both his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and also infringed upon federal jurisdiction over labor relations established by Congress through legislation such as the National Labor Relations Act and Taft-Hartley Act. However, Justice Felix Frankfurter writing for majority ruled against De Veau stating that there was no conflict between federal laws governing unions and this particular state statute aimed at curbing corruption on waterfronts; hence it did not violate Supremacy Clause or Commerce Clause of Constitution either. Furthermore, he concluded that prohibition against ex-felons holding union office did not violate Equal Protection clause because classification was reasonable given high levels of crime associated with these positions.
In the dissenting opinion for De Veau v. Braisted, Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Section 8 of Article VI of the New York State Constitution. He argued that this provision was not intended to disqualify individuals from holding union office due to past felony convictions, but rather aimed at preventing corruption in public offices by barring felons from such positions. According to him, applying this section to union officials would be an overreach and a misinterpretation of its original purpose. Furthermore, he contended that if it were applied as such, it could potentially infringe upon federal labor laws which allow unions autonomy in selecting their representatives. Thus, he believed that state law should not interfere with these federally protected rights unless explicitly allowed by Congress.