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In the case of Dean v. Gadsden Times Publishing Corp., 1972, the U.S Supreme Court was asked to consider whether a newspaper could be held liable for defamation after publishing an article that allegedly damaged a person's reputation. The plaintiff, Dean, had been accused in the article of being involved in illegal activities related to his business dealings. He sued for libel but lost at both trial and appellate levels because he failed to prove "actual malice" on part of the publisher - which is required under New York Times Co. v Sullivan (1964) when public figures sue for defamation. The Supreme Court declined to review this decision, effectively upholding it by default. This reaffirmed that newspapers have broad First Amendment protections against libel suits brought by public figures unless they can demonstrate actual malice – knowledge that information was false or reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
The dissenting opinion in the case of Dean v. Gadsden Times Publishing Corp., 1972, argued that the majority's decision to dismiss Dean's libel claim against The Gadsden Times was incorrect. The dissenters believed that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether or not the newspaper had acted with "actual malice" when it published an article about Dean. They pointed out that a jury could reasonably conclude from evidence presented at trial that the newspaper knew its statements about Dean were false or recklessly disregarded their truthfulness before publishing them. Therefore, they contended, summary judgment should not have been granted and instead, this issue should have been left for a jury to decide.