In the case of Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 1984, the U.S Supreme Court was tasked with deciding whether federal courts should defer arbitration proceedings in cases where both arbitrable and non-arbitrable issues are present until after litigation is complete. The dispute arose when William Byrd sued his brokerage firm, Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., alleging violations of both federal securities laws (non-arbitrable) and state law (arbitrable). The court ruled unanimously that there was no right to compel a stay of arbitration under these circumstances. They reasoned that the Federal Arbitration Act required district courts to compel arbitration on issues referable to arbitration even if this resulted in possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums for matters arising from the same set of facts.

In the dissenting opinion for Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, Justice White argued that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not require a stay of proceedings when all issues in a case are arbitrable but only some have been referred to arbitration. He contended that such an interpretation is inconsistent with both the language and legislative history of FAA Section 3, which he believed was intended to prevent delay rather than mandate it. Furthermore, he expressed concern about potential abuse by defendants who might use this ruling as a tactic to postpone litigation indefinitely by selectively invoking their right to arbitrate certain claims while leaving others pending before the court.