Decatur Bank v. St. Louis Bank was a case heard by the United States Supreme Court in 1874. The case involved a dispute between two banks over a check that had been issued by Decatur Bank and accepted by St. Louis Bank. Decatur Bank argued that the check was not valid because it had been issued without sufficient funds in the account. St. Louis Bank argued that the check was valid because it had been accepted by the bank and the funds had been transferred to the account of the payee. The Supreme Court held that the check was valid and that Decatur Bank was liable for the amount of the check. The Court reasoned that the check was valid because it had been accepted by St. Louis Bank and the funds had been transferred to the account of the payee. The Court also held that Decatur Bank was liable for the amount of the check because it had issued the check without sufficient funds in the account. The Court's decision in Decatur Bank v. St. Louis Bank established the principle that a bank is liable for the amount of a check it issues, even if the check is issued without sufficient funds in the account. This principle has been applied in numerous cases since the decision in Decatur Bank v. St. Louis Bank and is still applicable today.

In Decatur Bank v. St. Louis Bank, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a state court had jurisdiction to hear an action brought by a foreign corporation against another foreign corporation in which both were citizens of different states and neither resided nor carried on business within the forum state. The majority opinion held that such jurisdiction did not exist under the Constitution or laws of Congress, as there was no showing that either party had sufficient contacts with the forum state to justify its exercise of personal jurisdiction over them. Justice Field dissented from this decision, arguing that it would be unjust for one party to escape liability simply because they happened to reside outside of the forum state when their actions caused injury within it. He argued further that if Congress intended for parties who committed tortious acts in one State but resided elsewhere should be immune from suit then they should have explicitly stated so in legislation rather than leaving it up to judicial interpretation; however, since no such language exists he concluded that courts must interpret existing law liberally enough so as not deprive individuals injured by out-of-state actors access justice through due process protections afforded by our legal system