In the DeJonge v. Magone case of 1895, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of DeJonge, a stockholder who sued Magone, a collector of customs at the port of New York for refunding duties paid under protest on imported sugar. The court held that sugars above No.16 Dutch standard in color should be classified as "sugar candy" and not "sugar," which was subject to lower duty rates according to tariff laws enacted by Congress in 1883 and 1890 respectively. The decision hinged on whether or not these sugars were considered refined or raw based on their color grading rather than their actual refinement process - an issue left ambiguous by previous legislation. The ruling clarified this ambiguity stating that any sugar above No.16 Dutch Standard (regardless if it's been further refined) is deemed 'sugar candy' thus liable for higher import duties. This landmark decision had significant implications for future trade policy and tax law interpretations within the United States, particularly concerning commodity classifications and applicable tariffs.

In the dissenting opinion for DeJonge v. Magone, Justice Harlan argued that the majority's decision was a misinterpretation of the Constitution and an overreach of federal power. He contended that states should retain their sovereignty in matters not explicitly outlined in the Constitution, including taxation policies. In this case, he believed New York State had every right to tax out-of-state corporations operating within its borders at a higher rate than domestic ones without violating any constitutional principles or rights. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority's view that such differential treatment constituted discrimination against interstate commerce; instead, it was simply a state exercising its rightful authority to regulate businesses within its jurisdiction as it saw fit.