The U.S. Supreme Court case Deposit Guaranty National Bank of Jackson, Mississippi v. Roper et al., 1979 revolved around the issue of whether plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit could appeal after their individual claims had been satisfied by the defendant bank. The plaintiffs initially filed a suit against the bank for charging usurious interest rates on loans, but before it was certified as a class-action lawsuit, the bank paid off each plaintiff's claim and moved to dismiss them from court due to lack of controversy. However, they appealed this decision arguing that they should be allowed to represent other potential members who were similarly affected by these practices even though their own claims had been settled. In its ruling, the Supreme Court held that despite having received satisfaction for their personal grievances against Deposit Guaranty National Bank (DGNB), Roper and his co-plaintiffs retained an "economic interest" in shifting portions of attorney fees and expenses onto others with similar claims through successful litigation as part of a larger group or 'class'. Therefore, they maintained legal standing under Article III allowing them to pursue further appeals on behalf of all those potentially impacted by DGNB's alleged actions.

In the dissenting opinion for Deposit Guaranty National Bank of Jackson, Mississippi v. Roper et al., Justice Powell argued that the majority's decision was inconsistent with both precedent and policy. He contended that once a plaintiff’s claim is satisfied, whether through judgment or settlement, he should lose his status as a class representative because he no longer has an interest in the litigation’s outcome. The majority's ruling allowing plaintiffs to appeal after their claims have been satisfied could lead to unnecessary appeals and potentially endless litigation. Furthermore, it would undermine defendants' ability to make voluntary settlements without admitting liability - a key aspect of civil procedure which encourages dispute resolution outside courtrooms. Thus, according to Justice Powell's dissenting view, this ruling disrupts established legal principles and threatens efficient judicial administration.