In the case of Dickey v. Florida, 1969, the U.S Supreme Court examined whether a delay in prosecution violated an individual's right to a speedy trial as outlined by the Sixth Amendment. The defendant, William Earl Dickey was arrested for burglary in 1958 but his trial did not commence until eight years later due to various reasons including administrative delays and changes in counsel. He argued that this delay had prejudiced his ability to defend himself effectively because witnesses' memories had faded over time and some evidence was lost or destroyed during this period. The court ruled against Dickey with a majority opinion stating that while it recognized the importance of ensuring speedy trials, there were no rigid rules about what constituted an unreasonable delay. It held that each case should be considered on its own merits taking into account factors such as length of delay, reason for the delay and prejudice caused by it. However, Justice Potter Stewart dissented arguing that any unnecessary delays inherently compromised fairness regardless of actual prejudice suffered by defendants. This ruling set important precedents regarding interpretation of 'speedy trial' rights under Sixth Amendment.

In the dissenting opinion for Dickey v. Florida, Justice Harlan argued that the majority's decision to dismiss Dickey's conviction due to a six-year delay in trial was unjustified and inconsistent with previous rulings on speedy trial rights. He contended that delays alone should not be grounds for dismissal unless they significantly impair the defendant’s ability to defend themselves or are an intentional attempt by prosecution to gain tactical advantage. In this case, he believed neither condition had been met as there was no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct nor any indication that Dickey’s defense had been compromised by the delay. Furthermore, he pointed out that much of the delay could be attributed to Dickey himself who fled jurisdiction while awaiting trial and remained at large for several years before being apprehended again.