In the 1917 case of Dickinson v. Stiles, the US Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a receiver for a railway company could be held personally liable for damages resulting from an accident on the railway line. The plaintiff, Stiles, had been injured in an accident and sought compensation from both the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company and its receiver at that time, Dickinson. The court ruled that while receivers may be held responsible for their own negligent acts or omissions causing injury to others during their management of property under receivership; they are not personally accountable if they were not directly involved in such negligence nor can it be attributed to them due to lack of oversight or control over those who might have been negligent within scope of employment by them as receiver. Therefore, unless there is evidence showing personal fault on part of a receiver leading to injuries claimed by plaintiffs like Mr.Stiles here; claims against him should fail since he cannot be deemed vicariously liable merely because he happens to hold position as 'receiver' when accidents occur.

In the dissenting opinion for Dickinson v. Stiles, it was argued that the majority's decision to allow a receiver of an insolvent company to recover payments made in good faith by the debtor prior to receivership undermines commercial certainty and trust. The dissenting justices contended that such a ruling could discourage creditors from accepting payment from struggling businesses out of fear they may be required to return these funds if insolvency proceedings are later initiated. They also expressed concern about potential unfairness towards creditors who acted in good faith but might still face financial loss due to this ruling. Furthermore, they disagreed with the majority's interpretation of "preference" under bankruptcy law, arguing that not all payments made shortly before insolvency should automatically be considered preferential transfers subject to recovery by a receiver or trustee.