In the 1934 case of Dimick v. Schiedt, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that federal courts cannot order a new trial solely for determining damages if the initial award was deemed insufficient. The plaintiff, Dimick, had sued Schiedt for personal injuries and was awarded $1 in nominal damages by a jury. Dissatisfied with this amount, he requested a new trial to reassess only the damage amount rather than retrying all issues involved in his claim against Schiedt. However, the court held that such an action would violate Seventh Amendment rights guaranteeing a jury trial in civil cases because it would effectively allow judges to infrally re-examine facts tried by juries through ordering additur (an increase of inadequate damages). This decision established precedent limiting judicial power over damage awards decided by juries.

In the dissenting opinion for Dimick v. Schiedt, Justice Stone argued that the Seventh Amendment does not prohibit additur, a practice where a judge increases a jury's award of damages. He contended that this amendment was designed to preserve the right to trial by jury in common law cases as it existed in 1791 when it was adopted. However, he noted there were no federal rules or practices regarding additur at that time and thus its prohibition could not have been intended by those who framed and adopted the amendment. Furthermore, he pointed out that English courts had long used remittitur (the opposite of additur) without any objections on constitutional grounds from American courts adopting similar procedures. Therefore, Justice Stone believed there should be no different treatment between these two practices under American law.