Dirst v. Morris was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, William Dirst, was held in a federal prison in the state of Missouri. Dirst sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, claiming that he was being held in violation of his constitutional rights. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the state court should not be allowed to interfere with the federal government's power to protect the rights of individuals. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the state court should not be allowed to interfere with the federal government's power to protect the rights of individuals.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Dirst v. Morris, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to established law and precedent. He argued that a contract between two parties should be enforced according to its terms unless there is fraud or mistake involved, which he did not believe was present in this case. Furthermore, he noted that if one party breaches their agreement then they are liable for damages as long as those damages were foreseeable at the time of contracting. In this case, Justice Field believed it was clear from the language of the contract itself that both parties intended for any breach by either side to result in full compensation being paid out by them who breached it. Therefore, he concluded that since no fraud or mistake had been proven and since both sides agreed on what would happen if either side failed to fulfill their obligations under the contract then it should have been enforced accordingly with each party paying out whatever amount necessary for full performance of said agreement.