District of Columbia v. McElligott was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a municipality could be held liable for damages caused by a defective street. The case arose when a horse-drawn wagon driven by McElligott was overturned due to a defect in the street. McElligott sued the District of Columbia for damages, claiming that the defect was caused by the District's negligence in maintaining the street. The Supreme Court held that the District of Columbia could be held liable for damages caused by a defective street. The Court reasoned that the District had a duty to maintain the streets in a safe condition, and that it was liable for any damages caused by its failure to do so. The Court also noted that the District had a duty to inspect the streets and repair any defects that were discovered. The Court's decision in District of Columbia v. McElligott established that municipalities can be held liable for damages caused by defective streets. This decision has been cited in numerous subsequent cases involving municipal liability for damages caused by defective streets.

In District of Columbia v. McElligott, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a tax imposed on certain businesses in Washington D.C., including those engaged in the business of selling liquors and wines, violated the Constitution's prohibition against states passing laws impairing contracts between citizens of different states. The majority opinion held that such taxes were constitutional because they did not directly interfere with existing contractual obligations between parties from different states; rather, they only affected future transactions by imposing an additional cost for doing business within Washington D.C.. Justice Field dissented from this decision arguing that it would be impossible to impose such taxes without interfering with existing contracts since any increase in price could potentially alter their terms or render them unprofitable for one party or another. He argued further that if Congress had intended to allow taxation which interfered with interstate commerce then it would have been explicitly stated as part of its power over commerce granted under Article I Section 8 Clause 3 (the Commerce Clause). As no such language existed he concluded that these types of taxes were unconstitutional and should be struck down accordingly