| No search history |
Your feedback is extremely important to us and greatly appreciated.
Tell us what went wrong

In Doe, Ex Dem. Patterson v. Winn and Others, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a deed executed by an individual in his lifetime could be enforced against him after his death. The plaintiff argued that he had purchased land from one John Patterson before his death and that he should have title to it as if Patterson had been alive at the time of purchase. The defendants argued that since Patterson was deceased when they acquired their interest in the property, they were not bound by any agreement made between him and the plaintiff prior to his death. After considering both sides’ arguments, Chief Justice Marshall delivered a unanimous opinion for the court which held that although contracts are generally binding only on those who enter into them during their lifetimes, this particular contract could still be enforced even though it was entered into with someone who died before its completion because there is no legal prohibition against such enforcement under English common law or American statutes governing real estate transactions.
In Doe, ex dem. Patterson v. Winn and Others, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a deed of conveyance from an individual to another was valid when it had not been recorded in the county where the land lay as required by state law. The majority opinion held that since there had been no recordation of the deed, it could not be enforced against subsequent purchasers who were unaware of its existence; however, Chief Justice Marshall dissented on this point and argued that if a purchaser has actual knowledge of such a deed then they should be bound by it regardless of any failure to comply with recording requirements. He reasoned that equity demands protection for those who have acted in good faith and relied upon their own title or possession without notice from others claiming superior rights; thus he concluded that even though there had been no recordation here, if one party actually knew about another's claim then they should still be bound by it despite any technical noncompliance with statutory formalities.