In the case of Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Association in 1907, the U.S Supreme Court ruled that a credit reporting agency was not liable for defamation when it provided false information about a business to its subscribers. The court held that although the information was incorrect and potentially damaging, there was no malice involved as the agency believed it to be true at the time of publication. Furthermore, because this information had been shared confidentially with subscribers who had legitimate interest in knowing such details for their own protection against financial risk, it fell under qualified privilege - an exception to defamation law which protects certain communications if made without malice and based on a reasonable belief in their truthfulness. This ruling established important precedent regarding liability limits for credit agencies and other similar entities providing business intelligence services.

In the dissenting opinion for Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Association, Justice Harlan argued that the majority had erred in their interpretation of libel law and its application to this case. He contended that a credit report containing false information about an individual or business could indeed be considered libelous if it was distributed with reckless disregard for its accuracy. Harlan believed that such reports were not protected by any privilege because they were disseminated among paying subscribers rather than being shared confidentially between parties with a common interest, as is typically required for privilege to apply under defamation law. Furthermore, he asserted that even if some form of qualified privilege did protect these reports from liability, it should still be possible to sue for damages if one could prove malice on the part of the reporting agency - something which he felt was plausible given evidence presented in this case.