Dunbar v. Meyers was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, Dunbar, was held in a federal prison in the state of Ohio. Dunbar sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, claiming that he was being held in violation of his constitutional rights. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy that could only be used to challenge the legality of a prisoner's detention, and not to challenge the conditions of the prisoner's confinement. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Dunbar v. Meyers, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to established precedent and would lead to an unjust result. He argued that under existing law, a contract between two parties could not be voided by one of them without providing adequate consideration for it; however, this case involved a contract between three parties where only two had agreed to its terms. The majority held that since all three were bound by the agreement, any act of one party which violated its terms should void it entirely - even if there was no consideration given by those who sought to benefit from such action. Justice Field disagreed with this reasoning and instead argued that each party should be responsible for their own actions and not have their obligations discharged simply because another party acted improperly or failed to fulfill their part of the bargain. Furthermore, he noted that allowing such behavior would encourage fraud as well as undermine public confidence in contracts generally.