In Durland v. United States (1895), the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government has the authority to prosecute fraud cases involving U.S. Treasury bonds, even if they were not physically counterfeited. The case involved Charles F. Durland who had been convicted of using fraudulent means to sell worthless bonds purporting to be backed by a non-existent gold mine in Colorado, thereby defrauding investors out of their money. He appealed his conviction arguing that under Article I, Section 8, Clause 6 of the Constitution ("The Congress shall have Power...To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting"), only physical counterfeit activities could be prosecuted and not frauds like his which did not involve actual forgery or alteration of any securities issued by US Government itself but rather false representations about them. However, Justice Edward Douglass White writing for unanimous court rejected this narrow interpretation and upheld his conviction stating that "counterfeiting" as used in constitution also covers all types crimes related with deceitful manipulation or misuse public debt instruments including those committed through deceptive practices such as perpetrated by Mr.Durland.

In the dissenting opinion for Durland v. United States, Justice Field argued that the defendant's conviction was based on an overly broad interpretation of the federal counterfeiting statute. He contended that Congress intended to criminalize only those acts directly related to producing counterfeit currency or securities, not all fraudulent activities involving such items. The majority's broader reading would make a wide range of actions potentially punishable under federal law, which he believed was inconsistent with principles of limited government and individual liberty. Furthermore, he expressed concern about potential abuses if prosecutors were given too much discretion in charging decisions under this expansive interpretation.