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In the case of Larry Dean Dusenbery v. United States, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that due process was not violated when federal authorities auctioned off a prisoner's property without notifying him by certified mail. The plaintiff, Larry Dean Dusenbery, had been incarcerated for drug trafficking and his belongings were seized during his arrest in 1989 under civil forfeiture laws. While he was in prison, the FBI sent notices to both his last known address and to him directly at prison about their intent to sell these items but they did not use certified mail as required by law for such notifications. When he learned of this years later upon release from prison, Dusenbery sued on grounds that it violated his Fifth Amendment rights because he didn't receive adequate notice before government took possession of personal property permanently (a deprivation). However, the court held that while certified mail might have been more reliable than regular first-class postage used here or even hand-delivery at jail where letters can get lost easily among many inmates' correspondence coming through daily; what matters ultimately is whether notification method chosen is "reasonably calculated" under all circumstances present - which they found it was in this instance.
In the dissenting opinion for Larry Dean Dusenbery v. United States, Justice Stevens argued that due process requires more than just adherence to statutory procedure when it comes to notifying a prisoner of the government's intent to forfeit his property. He contended that while sending notice by certified mail may be sufficient in ordinary circumstances, it is not enough when dealing with incarcerated individuals who are unable to personally receive or sign for their mail. Instead, he suggested that prison officials should have been required to provide personal notification and an opportunity for response before any forfeiture could occur. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority's interpretation of "reasonably calculated" as meaning only what is written in statute rather than considering individual circumstances which might necessitate additional measures.