The Supreme Court case Early, Receiver v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond in 1929 revolved around the issue of whether or not a receiver appointed by a state court had the right to recover assets from an insolvent national bank that were transferred to the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) prior to receivership. The FRB argued it was protected under Section 4 of the Clayton Act which exempts certain transfers from being voided during insolvency proceedings. However, Justice Stone, writing for majority, ruled against FRB stating that this exemption only applied if such transfer was made in good faith and without any intention on part of either party involved to hinder or delay creditors' rights - something which wasn't established in this case. Therefore, he concluded that unless these conditions are met satisfactorily through evidence at trial court level; receiver has every right under National Bank Act's provisions related with fraudulent conveyances law to reclaim those assets.

In the dissenting opinion for Early v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Justice Stone argued that the majority's decision to allow a receiver to recover payments made by an insolvent bank was inconsistent with established principles of equity and bankruptcy law. He contended that under these laws, receivers are typically only allowed to recover fraudulent conveyances or preferences if they can prove that the recipient had reason to believe the debtor was insolvent at the time of payment. In this case, he noted there was no evidence suggesting that when it received payments from Peoples National Bank (PNB), Federal Reserve Bank knew PNB was insolvent. Therefore, according to him, allowing recovery in such circumstances would unjustly enrich creditors at expense of innocent parties who had no knowledge about insolvency while receiving payments in good faith.