Mead v. Pinyard was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a state could impose a tax on a foreign corporation. The case involved a dispute between the state of Virginia and the Mead Corporation, a foreign corporation that operated a paper mill in the state. The state had imposed a tax on the corporation, which the corporation argued was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court held that the state of Virginia had the authority to impose a tax on the foreign corporation. The Court reasoned that the state had the power to tax foreign corporations that operated within its borders, and that the tax was not an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The Court also noted that the tax was not discriminatory, as it applied equally to all foreign corporations operating in the state. The Court's decision in Mead v. Pinyard established that states have the authority to impose taxes on foreign corporations operating within their borders. This decision has been cited in numerous subsequent cases involving the taxation of foreign corporations.

Justice Harlan delivered a dissenting opinion in the case of Mead v. Pinyard, arguing that the majority's decision was incorrect and should be reversed. He argued that under Kentucky law, which governed this case, an executor had no authority to sell real estate owned by a decedent without first obtaining court approval. The majority held that since there was no evidence of fraud or bad faith on behalf of the executor in selling the property without such approval, it could not be set aside as voidable; however Justice Harlan disagreed with this conclusion because he believed it would lead to unjust results for those who were unaware of their rights when dealing with an executor. He further noted that if an individual is aware they have certain legal rights but fails to exercise them due to negligence or ignorance then they cannot later complain about any resulting injustice - thus making court intervention unnecessary in cases like these where there has been no fraud or bad faith on behalf of the executor. Ultimately Justice Harlan concluded his dissent by stating "I am unable to concur in holding...that one may take advantage of his own wrong."