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In the case of Ellis B. Wright, Jr., Warden and Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General of Virginia v. Frank Robert West, Jr., 1991, the U.S Supreme Court dealt with issues related to habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners in federal courts. The petitioner was a warden at a Virginia prison where West was incarcerated for murder conviction. West had exhausted his state remedies and sought relief from federal court claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial which violated his Sixth Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed this claim but Fourth Circuit reversed it stating that attorney's failure to object to certain evidence constituted deficient performance prejudicing defendant’s case. The Supreme Court held that Federal Habeas Corpus law does not require an evidentiary hearing if factual disputes do not resolve constitutional issue or if State court trier of fact has reliably found pertinent facts after fair hearing; thus reversing Fourth Circuit's decision as they failed to apply these principles properly while granting writ based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.
In the dissenting opinion for Ellis B. Wright, Jr., Warden and Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General of Virginia v. Frank Robert West, Jr., Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority's ruling that a state prisoner can use federal habeas corpus to challenge his conviction on grounds not raised in state court due to ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that this interpretation expanded the scope of federal habeas review beyond its historical limits and undermined principles of finality and comity between state and federal courts. Scalia contended that a claim alleging ineffective assistance should be treated as any other claim: if it was not presented in state court because of attorney error, then it is procedurally defaulted unless cause for default can be shown. He also criticized the majority’s decision as creating an incentive for defense attorneys to intentionally avoid raising certain issues at trial or on appeal so they could later argue their own ineffectiveness as cause for procedural default.