Term: 2014
Docket: 13-983
Elonis v. United States
- Pro
13-983 ELONIS V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 730 F.3d 321 IN ADDITION TO THE QUESTION PRESENTED BY THE PETITION, THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: “Whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation, conviction of threatening another person under 18 U.S.C. §875(c) requires proof of the defendant’s subjective intent to threaten.” CERT. GRANTED 6/16/2014 QUESTION PRESENTED: It is a federal crime to "transmit[] in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing * * * any threat to injure the person of another," 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). Numerous states have adopted analogous crimes. The question presented is: Whether, consistent with the First Amendment and Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), conviction of threatening another person requires proof of the defendant's subjective intent to threaten, as required by the Ninth Circuit and the supreme courts of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont; or whether it is enough to show that a "reasonable person" would regard the statement as threatening, as held by other federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 12-3798
The case of Elonis v. United States in 2014 revolved around the issue of threats made over social media and how they are interpreted under law. Anthony Elonis was convicted for making threatening statements towards his estranged wife, local police, a kindergarten class, and an FBI agent on Facebook after his wife left him. He argued that these posts were therapeutic forms of expression and protected by the First Amendment as free speech. The Supreme Court ruled 7-2 in favor of Elonis stating that it wasn't enough to convict someone based solely on how their message could be perceived by others; there must be proof that the person intended their words to be taken as a threat.
In the dissenting opinion for Elonis v. United States, Justice Samuel Alito argued that the majority's decision to overturn Anthony Elonis' conviction was based on an overly narrow interpretation of what constitutes a "true threat." He contended that it is not necessary for a person to have intended their words as threats in order for them to be legally considered as such. Instead, he suggested that if a reasonable person would perceive the words as threatening, they should be treated accordingly under law. Furthermore, Alito criticized the majority's reliance on general criminal intent standards rather than focusing specifically on those related to communication crimes like harassment and stalking. He also expressed concern about potential implications of this ruling for victims of domestic violence and online abuse who may find it more difficult to seek legal protection against threatening behavior due its new requirement proving subjective intent.
