In the 1989 case of Vera M. English v. General Electric Company, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an employee's state law tort claims against her employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress were preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). The plaintiff, Vera M. English, was a nuclear quality control inspector at General Electric who alleged she had been subjected to harassment and intimidation after refusing to falsify safety-related documents as instructed by her supervisors. She filed suit under Kentucky law claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress and violation of public policy among other charges. The court held that when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis or interpretation of terms in a collective-bargaining agreement between an employer and labor union, federal labor-law principles necessitate preemption under LMRA Section 301 because it would require uniformity in its application across states.

In the dissenting opinion for Vera M. English v. General Electric Company, Justice Blackmun argued that the majority's decision was a departure from established precedent regarding preemption and workers' rights to safety in their workplaces. He contended that federal law did not preempt state tort claims because it did not provide an adequate substitute remedy for injured employees like English who suffered retaliation after reporting nuclear safety violations at her workplace. The Nuclear Whistleblower Protection Act only provided procedural protections but didn't offer substantive remedies such as damages or reinstatement, which are typically available under state law tort claims. Therefore, he believed that allowing GE to escape liability would undermine Congress's intent of encouraging employees to report unsafe conditions without fear of reprisal and leave whistleblowers inadequately protected against employer retaliation.