In Epton v. New York, 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review a case involving Benjamin J. Epton, a member of the Progressive Labor Movement who was convicted under New York's criminal anarchy law for advocating and inciting violent overthrow of the government during Harlem riots in 1964. The court upheld his conviction by refusing to hear his appeal on grounds that he had not exhausted all state remedies before seeking federal relief - specifically, he hadn't appealed to New York’s highest court after losing at intermediate appellate level. Epton argued that his First Amendment rights were violated as he was punished for mere advocacy rather than direct incitement of imminent lawless action – which is protected speech according to Brandenburg test established later in 1969 (Brandenburg v Ohio). However, this argument wasn’t considered since it came up post-trial and because Brandenburg standard didn’t exist when Epton was tried. The refusal by Supreme Court left standing lower courts' rulings that distinguished between abstract doctrine and actual advocacy or planning of violence; thus affirming legitimacy of laws punishing seditious speech if there's clear danger such words would lead directly to unlawful actions.

In the dissenting opinion for EPTON v. NEW YORK, Justice William O. Douglas argued that the convictions of Benjamin J. Davis and Conrad Lynn should be reversed due to their First Amendment rights being violated by New York's criminal anarchy law. He believed that these individuals were punished not for inciting violence or advocating illegal action, but rather for expressing unpopular political beliefs - a violation of free speech protections under the Constitution. Furthermore, he contended that there was no clear evidence presented in court demonstrating any imminent danger posed by their speeches or writings which could justify such severe restrictions on their freedom of expression.