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In the 1944 case Estate of Putnam; Guaranty Trust Co., Executor, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the U.S. Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether certain securities were includable in a decedent's gross estate for federal tax purposes. The securities in question had been transferred by Mrs. Putnam to her husband under an agreement that he would return them upon request or at his death if she survived him; however, Mr. Putnam predeceased his wife and left these assets to other beneficiaries via trust funds instead of returning them to her as per their agreement. The court ruled that these securities should be included in Mrs.Putnam’s gross estate because they were essentially hers during her lifetime due to the terms of their transfer agreement - even though she did not physically possess them at the time of her death nor receive any income from them during her life after transferring ownership to Mr.Putman. This decision established a precedent regarding how property rights are evaluated for taxation purposes when there is an understanding or arrangement between parties about future possession or control over those properties.
In the dissenting opinion for Estate of Putnam v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, it was argued that the majority's decision to include in a decedent’s gross estate property transferred by her before death contradicted established legal principles and precedent. The dissenting justices contended that previous case law had clearly determined that such transfers were not subject to federal estate tax unless they were made without adequate consideration or with an intent to evade taxes. They believed this principle should have been applied in the present case, where Mrs. Putnam had transferred securities into a trust years prior to her death and received regular income from them until she died. The dissenters also disagreed with the majority's interpretation of relevant statutory provisions, arguing they did not support treating these types of transfers as part of a decedent’s gross estate for taxation purposes.