Ex parte Garland is a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a former Confederate politician was eligible to practice law before the Supreme Court. The case was argued by former Confederate Senator and Attorney General Reverdy Johnson on behalf of his client, former Confederate Senator Augustus Hill Garland. At issue was whether Garland, who had been a member of the Confederate Congress, was eligible to practice law before the Supreme Court. The Court held that Garland was eligible to practice law before the Court, despite his prior service in the Confederate Congress. The Court reasoned that Garland had taken no part in the rebellion and had been pardoned by President Andrew Johnson. The Court also noted that Garland had been a loyal citizen of the United States since the end of the Civil War. The Court's decision in Ex parte Garland was significant in that it established that former Confederate politicians were eligible to practice law before the Supreme Court. This decision was seen as a sign of reconciliation between the North and South following the Civil War. The decision also established a precedent that would be followed in subsequent cases involving former Confederate politicians.

Ex Parte Garland was a Supreme Court case in which the court ruled on whether or not former Confederate officials were eligible to practice law before the federal courts. The majority opinion held that Congress had no power to disqualify these individuals from practicing law, and thus they should be allowed to do so. However, Justice Stephen Field dissented from this ruling, arguing that Congress did have the authority under Article III of the Constitution to bar those who had been engaged in rebellion against their country from appearing as attorneys before any court established by its laws. He further argued that allowing such persons into positions of trust would undermine public confidence in government institutions and weaken respect for constitutional obligations among citizens. Field concluded his dissent by noting that while he believed it was within Congress's power to exclude former Confederates from practicing law, he thought it unwise for them to exercise such a right at this time due to lingering animosity between North and South following the Civil War.