In the case of Ex Parte in the Matter of Philip Grossman, 1924, petitioner Philip Grossman was convicted for contempt of court after he continued to sell alcohol despite a federal injunction during Prohibition. He was pardoned by President Calvin Coolidge but still required to pay a fine. The Supreme Court had to decide whether presidential pardon power extended to cases involving contempt of court. In its decision, the Court held that presidents do have this authority under Article II Section 2 Clause 1 (the Pardon Clause) of the U.S Constitution which grants them power "to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States." Thus, even though contempt is an offense directed at judicial authority rather than federal law per se, it falls within presidential purview because it's considered an 'offense against United States'. This ruling established that executive clemency can override judicial decisions in certain circumstances.

In the dissenting opinion for Ex Parte Grossman, Justice James Clark McReynolds argued that the President's power to pardon should not extend to contempt of court charges. He maintained that such an interpretation would undermine the independence and authority of the judiciary branch. According to him, if a president could pardon contempt charges, it would allow executive interference in judicial proceedings and disrupt checks and balances system established by Constitution. Furthermore, he contended that historically pardoning power was never intended or used this way; it was meant for crimes against state rather than violations of court orders. Thus, he disagreed with majority’s view which upheld presidential prerogative to pardon Grossman who had been convicted for violating a federal court injunction.