In Ex Parte In the Matter of David A. Secombe, a case heard before the United States Supreme Court in 1856, an appeal was made by David A. Secombe from a decision of the Circuit Court for Florida which had denied his petition to be discharged from imprisonment under an attachment issued against him as security for costs and damages due to another party in a civil suit. The Supreme Court held that it did not have jurisdiction over this matter because there was no federal question involved; rather, it was purely within the realm of state law and thus could only be decided by state courts. Furthermore, they noted that even if they were able to hear such cases on appeal from state court decisions, their power would still be limited since Congress has never given them authority to issue writs or orders directing any person or corporation how he should act with respect thereto. As such, they dismissed Mr. Secombe's petition without prejudice and remanded it back down to the circuit court for further proceedings according to applicable laws at that time

In Ex Parte, In the Matter of David A. Secombe, Chief Justice Taney delivered a dissenting opinion in which he argued that Congress had no authority to pass laws concerning slavery and that any such law would be unconstitutional. He further argued that the Fugitive Slave Act was an attempt by Congress to interfere with state sovereignty and should not be enforced. He also believed that it violated due process rights as well as other constitutional protections for individuals accused of being fugitive slaves. Furthermore, he asserted that if a person is found guilty under this act then they are denied their right to trial by jury or even access to counsel during proceedings against them. Finally, Taney concluded his dissent by stating his belief that the federal government has no power over slavery within individual states and therefore cannot enforce its own laws on this matter without violating state sovereignty or infringing upon individual rights protected under the Constitution.