In the 1919 Supreme Court case, Ex parte IN THE MATTER OF J. RAYMOND TIFFANY, AS RECEIVER, ETC., PETITIONER, the court dealt with a dispute over jurisdiction and bankruptcy proceedings. The petitioner was appointed as receiver for an insolvent corporation by a federal district court in New York but later faced legal action from creditors in California who sought to have their own receiver appointed there. Tiffany petitioned the Supreme Court directly for a writ of prohibition or mandamus to prevent this parallel proceeding from going forward on grounds that it would interfere with his administration of assets under control of the New York court. However, the Supreme Court denied his request stating that he had not exhausted all other remedies available at lower courts before seeking intervention from them; therefore they lacked jurisdiction to grant relief.

The dissenting opinion in the case of Ex parte IN THE MATTER OF J. RAYMOND TIFFANY, AS RECEIVER, ETC., PETITIONER (1919) argued that the court had overstepped its jurisdiction by intervening in a matter that should have been left to state courts. The justice believed that federal courts did not have authority to issue writs of habeas corpus except under specific circumstances outlined by Congress and felt this was not one such circumstance. They contended that it was inappropriate for federal courts to interfere with state judicial proceedings unless there were clear violations of constitutional rights or other serious legal errors involved. This view held strong respect for states' rights and autonomy within their own jurisdictions, emphasizing the importance of maintaining balance between federal and state powers as intended by the Constitution's framers.