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10-1024 FAA V. COOPER DECISION BELOW: 622 F.3d 1016 JUSTICE KAGAN TOOK NO PART. CERT. GRANTED 6/20/2011 QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether a plaintiff who alleges only mental and emotional injuries can establish "actual damages" within the meaning of the civil remedies provision of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a(g)(4)(A). LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 08-17074
In the case of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) v. Stanmore Cawthon Cooper in 2011, the U.S Supreme Court was tasked with deciding whether or not the FAA violated Cooper's privacy rights under the Privacy Act by disclosing his HIV status to Social Security Administration without his consent. The issue arose when Cooper, a pilot who had hidden his HIV-positive status from FAA due to fear of losing his license, applied for long-term disability benefits from Social Security Administration and disclosed this information there. Under Operation Safe Pilot - an interagency initiative aimed at identifying medically unfit pilots - FAA obtained this information and revoked Cooper’s license as a result. He sued alleging violation of Privacy Act which prohibits federal agencies from sharing an individual's records without their written consent unless it falls within one of its exceptions. The court ruled that while FAA did violate Privacy Act, they were immune from emotional distress damages sought by Mr.Cooper because such damages are only recoverable if government intentionally or willfully violates said act.
In the dissenting opinion for Federal Aviation Administration v. Stanmore Cawthon Cooper, it was argued that the majority's decision to allow a pilot who had lied about his HIV status to sue under the Privacy Act of 1974 set a dangerous precedent. The dissenters believed that this ruling could potentially incentivize dishonesty and undermine public safety by protecting those who lie on federal forms from facing consequences for their actions. They also expressed concern over how broadly the majority interpreted "actual damages" in relation to emotional distress claims under the Privacy Act, arguing that such an interpretation could open up floodgates of litigation and strain resources unnecessarily.