In the case of Fare v. Michael C., 1978, a juvenile named Michael C. was taken into custody for suspected involvement in a murder. During interrogation, he requested to speak with his probation officer instead of an attorney which police denied and continued questioning him without legal counsel present. The Supreme Court had to decide whether this violated his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona (1966). In a 5-4 decision, the court ruled that it did not violate these rights because asking for a probation officer does not equate to invoking one's right to have an attorney present during questioning as established by Miranda rules; hence, any statements made were admissible in court.

In the dissenting opinion for Fare v. Michael C., Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, argued that the majority's decision to allow a probation officer to act as an adequate substitute for an attorney during police interrogation was fundamentally flawed. They contended that this ruling undermines the rights of juveniles and fails to recognize their vulnerability in such situations. The dissenters believed that only legal counsel could provide sufficient protection against self-incrimination under Miranda rights, especially given the complex nature of criminal law and procedure which is beyond a layperson’s understanding including probation officers'. Furthermore, they expressed concern about potential conflicts of interest since probation officers are part of law enforcement system whose primary duty is not necessarily aligned with protecting individual rights but rather public safety. Thus, they concluded allowing non-legal professionals like probation officers to replace attorneys during interrogations would lead to serious erosion of constitutional safeguards intended by Miranda rules.