In the 1958 case of Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union of America, North Dakota Division v. WDAY, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of WDAY, a broadcasting company that had been sued for defamation by the Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union (FECU). The FECU claimed that they were defamed during a political broadcast where their organization was criticized. However, under Section 315(a) of the Federal Communications Act which provides immunity to broadcasters from liability for defamation in speeches or debates made by legally qualified candidates for public office during campaign periods, WDAY was protected as it did not censor or control what was said on air. The court held that this section served an important purpose: ensuring free and robust debate on public issues without broadcaster self-censorship due to fear of civil liability.

In the dissenting opinion for Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union of America, North Dakota Division v. WDAY, Inc., Justice Harlan argued that the Court's decision to reverse and remand was incorrect because it failed to consider whether or not there was actual malice in the defendant's statements. He believed that this case should have been treated as a defamation suit rather than an issue of free speech rights under the First Amendment. According to him, if a statement is made with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for its truthfulness, then such statement can be considered malicious and thus subject to legal action regardless of any potential public interest involved. In his view, by failing to take into account these factors when considering libel cases involving public figures or matters of public concern could potentially lead towards undermining individuals' reputations without sufficient cause.