In the 1891 case of Farnsworth v. Duffner, the United States Supreme Court dealt with a dispute over land ownership in Oklahoma Territory. The plaintiff, Farnsworth, claimed that he had purchased a tract of land from an individual who had obtained it through a government lottery system designed to distribute unassigned lands in the territory. However, Duffner argued that this sale was invalid because at the time of purchase, Farnsworth was not present on said land as required by law for such transactions to be valid. The court ruled in favor of Duffner and held that physical presence on the property at issue is indeed necessary for legal acquisition under these circumstances. It further clarified that even if someone has made improvements or cultivated crops on such lands without being physically present thereon does not constitute constructive possession and thus cannot claim ownership rights based upon those activities alone.

The dissenting opinion in the case of Farnsworth v. Duffner argued that the majority's decision was inconsistent with established principles of contract law and unjustly favored one party over another. The dissent disagreed with the majority's interpretation of a clause in a land sale agreement, arguing that it should not have been read as an absolute promise to convey clear title to certain property but rather as a conditional promise dependent on whether such title could be obtained from third parties. They contended this reading would better align with traditional understandings of risk allocation in contracts for sale, where sellers are generally not held responsible for unforeseen obstacles to performance unless they expressly agree otherwise. Furthermore, they criticized the majority for failing to consider evidence suggesting that both parties understood and intended this more limited obligation at the time they entered into their agreement.