| No search history |
Your feedback is extremely important to us and greatly appreciated.
Tell us what went wrong

In the 1993 case Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. John H. Meyer, the United States Supreme Court ruled on whether a federal court could exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant based solely on his position as an officer or director of a nationally chartered bank. The FDIC had sued Meyer in Kansas for alleged negligence and breach of fiduciary duty while he was president of a failed national bank located in Kansas, but he lived and worked in Texas at all relevant times. The District Court dismissed the suit due to lack of personal jurisdiction, which was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court reversed these decisions, holding that under federal law (12 U.S.C § 1819(b)(2)), nationwide service is permissible when suing federally insured banks' directors or officers for their professional conduct related to those institutions regardless where they reside or work personally. Therefore, it concluded that exercising jurisdiction over Meyer did not violate Due Process Clause because his actions were tied with 'minimum contacts' within any judicial district across America given his role at this national institution.
In the dissenting opinion for Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. John H. Meyer, Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority's interpretation of federal law regarding bank receiverships. He argued that the language of the statute clearly states that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims against failed banks in receivership unless a specific exception applies - which was not applicable in this case according to him. Furthermore, he criticized the majority's reliance on legislative history and policy considerations to justify their decision, stating that these factors should only be used when statutory text is ambiguous or leads to absurd results - neither of which were true here as per his view. In conclusion, Justice Scalia believed that Congress intended for state courts to share jurisdiction over such cases with federal courts and thus would have allowed Meyer’s claim against FDIC (as receiver) proceed in state court.