Feild v. Farrington was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, William Feild, was held in a federal prison in the state of New York. Feild sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, which was denied by the court on the grounds that the court did not have the authority to issue such a writ. Feild then appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right and that the state court should not be allowed to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right and that the state court should not be allowed to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals.

In the case of Feild v. Farrington, Justice Field delivered a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority had erred in their interpretation of the law. He asserted that Congress had not intended to limit its power over interstate commerce when it passed legislation regarding steamboats and ferries operating on navigable waters within state boundaries. According to Field, this was evidenced by language used throughout the statute which indicated an intent to regulate all aspects of such vessels' operations regardless of whether they were crossing state lines or not. Furthermore, he noted that if Congress did intend for its powers to be limited as suggested by the majority then it would have been unnecessary for them to include provisions related specifically to interstate commerce since those activities would already be regulated under existing laws governing navigation between states. In conclusion, Justice Field concluded that Congress clearly meant what they said when passing this particular piece of legislation and thus should be given full effect without any judicial interference or limitation based on perceived intentions behind it.