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In the 1994 case First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Manuel Kaplan and MK Investments, Inc., the U.S Supreme Court was tasked with determining who should decide whether an arbitration panel has jurisdiction over a dispute - a court or the arbitrators themselves. The Kaplans had entered into an agreement to arbitrate disputes with First Options but later argued that their corporation, MK Investments (MKI), had not agreed to this arrangement when it became involved in related transactions. When disagreements arose between these parties, they were taken before an arbitration panel which ruled in favor of First Options. However, on appeal by the Kaplans and MKI claiming that they never agreed for such disputes involving MKI to be settled through arbitration; lower courts sided with them stating that such matters are for courts to decide unless there is clear evidence showing otherwise. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision unanimously holding that unless parties clearly agree otherwise; questions about whether a party has consented to arbitrate should be decided by courts rather than arbitrators due its importance as it affects fundamental rights of individuals like right to access justice system.
In the dissenting opinion for First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, Justice Thomas argued that the majority's decision to allow courts rather than arbitrators to decide on issues of arbitration was incorrect. He believed that this approach undermined the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)'s primary purpose: promoting swift and efficient dispute resolution through arbitration instead of litigation in courtrooms. According to him, by allowing a court to review an arbitrator’s decision about his or her jurisdiction de novo (from scratch), it would delay proceedings and increase costs - contrary to what FAA intended. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority's view that silence or ambiguity should be interpreted as evidence against granting authority over such matters to an arbitrator; he felt this interpretation was inconsistent with other areas where law favors arbitration.