Fisher v. Kelsey was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, William Fisher, was held in a federal prison in the state of Ohio. Fisher sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, claiming that he was being held in violation of his constitutional rights. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy that could only be used to challenge the legality of a person's detention, and not to challenge the conditions of the detention. The Court's decision in Fisher v. Kelsey established that state courts do not have the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners held in federal prisons. This decision has been cited in numerous subsequent cases, and has been used to support the principle that state courts cannot interfere with the federal government's authority to imprison individuals.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Fisher v. Kelsey, arguing that the majority's decision was incorrect and should be reversed. He argued that a state law cannot interfere with or control contracts made between citizens of different states, as this would violate Article I Section 10 of the Constitution which prohibits any state from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Furthermore, he noted that while it is true that a contract must conform to public policy within its own jurisdiction, it does not follow that such policy can be enforced by one state upon another through legislation passed by either party. Justice Field concluded his dissent by noting how important it is for individuals to have faith in their contractual obligations and how allowing states to pass laws interfering with those obligations could lead to great uncertainty and confusion among parties entering into interstate agreements.