In the 1933 case of Fix, Collector of Internal Revenue v. Philadelphia Barge Co., the U.S Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a tax imposed on vessels used in coastal trade violated the Export Clause of the Constitution. The Philadelphia Barge Company argued that their barges were engaged in export trade and thus exempt from taxation under this clause. However, the court ruled against them stating that while goods transported by these barges eventually ended up overseas, they were not directly involved in exporting goods but rather partook in domestic commerce before reaching an exporter. Therefore, they did not qualify for exemption under this clause as it only applied to items being exported out of country directly and not those involved indirectly through internal transportation prior to exportation.

In the dissenting opinion for FIX, COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, v. PHILADELPHIA BARGE CO. et al., Justice Cardozo disagreed with the majority's decision that a tax on fuel oil carried by barges was unconstitutional because it interfered with interstate commerce. He argued that this interpretation of the Commerce Clause was too broad and would lead to an untenable situation where states could not levy any taxes on goods in transit across state lines. He pointed out that such a rule would create significant problems for states trying to raise revenue and could potentially disrupt economic activity within their borders. Furthermore, he contended that there is no constitutional provision or precedent supporting such an expansive reading of the Commerce Clause.