In the 1897 case of Fletcher v. Baltimore and Potomac Railroad Company, the U.S Supreme Court ruled in favor of the railroad company. The plaintiff, Mr. Fletcher, had sued for damages after his wife was killed by a train at a street crossing in Washington D.C., alleging that the company was negligent because it failed to provide adequate warning of an approaching train. However, evidence presented during trial showed that there were multiple warnings including a flagman stationed at the crossing who waved his flag as soon as he saw Mrs. Fletcher on track but she didn't heed to these warnings due to her deafness which wasn't known by any employee of defendant's railway company until after accident occurred. The court held that while railroads have an obligation to exercise reasonable care and caution at crossings, this duty does not extend indefinitely or without limit; pedestrians also have responsibility for their own safety when using such crossings and must take notice of obvious dangers like moving trains even if they are deaf or blind unless their condition is known beforehand by those operating said trains. Therefore since Mrs.Fletcher ignored clear signals indicating danger despite having capacity to perceive them (as evidenced by her ability see flagman waving), no negligence could be attributed towards defendants hence they weren't liable for resulting death.

In the dissenting opinion for Fletcher v. Baltimore and Potomac Railroad Company, Justice Harlan argued that the majority's decision was a misinterpretation of Congress' intent when it passed legislation regulating railroad companies in Washington D.C. He contended that this law was intended to protect pedestrians from harm caused by trains, not to absolve railroads of liability for injuries they cause. According to him, if a pedestrian is injured due to their own negligence while crossing train tracks at an unauthorized location, then the railroad company should be held liable only if its employees could have prevented the accident but failed or neglected to do so. He disagreed with the majority's view that such pedestrians are trespassers whom railroads owe no duty of care under any circumstances. Instead, he believed that whether someone is considered a trespasser depends on specific facts and circumstances which should be determined by juries rather than judges as a matter of law.