Fletcher v. Fuller was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, Fletcher, was held in a federal prison in the state of Georgia. Fletcher sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, claiming that he was being held in violation of the Constitution. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy that could only be used to challenge the legality of a person's detention, and not to challenge the conditions of the detention. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Fletcher v. Fuller, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to established precedent and would lead to a dangerous expansion of federal power. He argued that Congress had no authority under the Constitution to pass legislation which interfered with state court judgments or proceedings, as it did in this case by allowing an appeal from a judgment rendered by a state court on matters of local law. Furthermore, he noted that such interference could be used by Congress as leverage against states who refused to comply with its wishes on other matters. Justice Field concluded his dissent by noting that if allowed to stand, this ruling would open up "a wide field for congressional interference" into areas traditionally reserved for state courts and legislatures - something he believed should not be done without explicit constitutional authorization from either Congress or the Supreme Court itself.