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In Fort v. Roush, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to compel a county auditor to issue a tax deed. The case arose when the plaintiff, Fort, purchased a tract of land from the county auditor of Muskingum County, Ohio. The county auditor refused to issue a tax deed for the property, claiming that the county had not received payment for the taxes due on the property. Fort then filed a petition in the state court, asking the court to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the county auditor to issue the tax deed. The state court granted the writ, and the county auditor appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court had the authority to issue the writ of mandamus. The Court reasoned that the state court had the power to issue the writ because the county auditor was a public officer, and the writ was necessary to compel him to perform his public duty. The Court also noted that the writ was necessary to protect the rights of the plaintiff, who had purchased the property in good faith and was entitled to the tax deed. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court had the authority to issue the writ of mandamus to compel the county auditor to issue the tax deed. The Court reasoned that the writ was necessary to protect the rights of the plaintiff and to ensure that the county auditor performed his public duty.
Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Fort v. Roush, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to both law and justice. He argued that a contract between two parties should be enforced according to its terms unless it is illegal or against public policy. In this case, there was no evidence of illegality or public policy considerations; thus, he believed that the contract should have been enforced as written. Furthermore, Justice Field noted that even if there had been some ambiguity in the language of the agreement, it would still have been up to a jury—not an appellate court—to interpret and decide on any ambiguities present within it. As such, he concluded by stating his belief that "the judgment below ought not to be reversed."