Freedman's Savings & Trust Company v. Earle was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of attachment against a national bank. The case arose when the Freedman's Savings & Trust Company, a national bank, was sued by a creditor in a state court. The creditor obtained a writ of attachment against the bank, which the bank argued was unconstitutional because it violated the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the writ of attachment was unconstitutional because it violated the supremacy clause. The Court reasoned that the supremacy clause of the Constitution gave the federal government exclusive authority over national banks, and that state courts did not have the authority to issue writs of attachment against them. The Court also held that the writ of attachment was invalid because it was issued without notice to the bank, which violated the bank's due process rights. The Court's decision in this case established that state courts do not have the authority to issue writs of attachment against national banks, and that any such writs must be issued with notice to the bank in order to be valid. This decision has been cited in numerous subsequent cases involving the supremacy clause and the rights of national banks.

In Freedman's Savings & Trust Company v. Earle, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a state court had jurisdiction over a federal corporation created by Congress. The majority opinion held that the state court did not have jurisdiction because it would interfere with congressional power and violate the supremacy clause of the Constitution. However, Justice Field dissented from this decision on two grounds: first, he argued that Congress had not intended to give exclusive authority over such corporations to federal courts; second, he argued that there were no constitutional provisions preventing states from exercising their own judicial powers in matters involving these corporations. He concluded that allowing states to exercise their own judicial powers in such cases would be consistent with both congressional intent and constitutional principles.