| No search history |
Your feedback is extremely important to us and greatly appreciated.
Tell us what went wrong

In the case of Peter E. Frevall vs Franklin Bache, Administrator of John Dabadie, Deceased, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a Louisiana state court judgment should be enforced in Mississippi. The appellant argued that since he had obtained a valid judgment from a Louisiana court against his debtor's estate and it was not appealed or reversed by any higher authority in Louisiana, then it should be recognized as binding on the appellee who resided in Mississippi. The Supreme Court disagreed with this argument and held that judgments rendered by courts outside of Mississippi were not enforceable within its borders unless they were specifically authorized by statute or treaty between states. Furthermore, even if such authorization existed at some point during the proceedings before the lower court issued its decision, it did not automatically make all prior decisions from other states binding upon citizens residing within Mississippi without further action being taken to recognize them as such.
In the case of Peter E. Frevall v Franklin Bache, Administrator of John Dabadie, Deceased, the dissenting opinion argued that a contract between two parties should be enforced as written and not subject to judicial interpretation or modification. The appellant had entered into an agreement with the deceased in which he was to receive certain property upon payment of a debt owed by the deceased. The court majority held that since this agreement did not specify how much time would be allowed for payment before title passed from one party to another it could be modified by courts according to their own discretion; however, Justice Catron dissented arguing that such contracts are binding on both parties and should remain so unless they are mutually agreed upon otherwise. He further argued that if either party wished for more specific terms then those should have been included in writing at the time of signing rather than allowing judges to interpret them after-the-fact. Ultimately Justice Catron's dissent stood firm on his belief that contracts must remain inviolable once signed and any changes must come through mutual consent only.