Frow v. De La Vega was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a contract between two parties was valid. The case involved a contract between Frow, a merchant, and De La Vega, a ship captain, for the transportation of goods from San Francisco to Valparaiso, Chile. Frow had agreed to pay De La Vega a certain amount of money for the transportation of the goods, but De La Vega failed to deliver the goods as promised. The Supreme Court held that the contract between Frow and De La Vega was valid and enforceable. The Court reasoned that the contract was made in good faith and that both parties had the capacity to enter into the contract. The Court also noted that the contract was supported by consideration, meaning that both parties had exchanged something of value in order to enter into the agreement. The Court also held that Frow was entitled to damages for De La Vega's breach of the contract. The Court reasoned that Frow had suffered a loss due to De La Vega's failure to deliver the goods as promised, and that Frow was entitled to be compensated for this loss. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the contract between Frow and De La Vega was valid and enforceable, and that Frow was entitled to damages for De La Vega's breach of the contract.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Frow v. De La Vega, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to established precedent and would lead to unjust results. He argued that under existing law, a contract could not be enforced if it had been procured by fraud or misrepresentation of material facts. In this case, he believed there was sufficient evidence of fraudulent conduct on behalf of De La Vega which should have precluded him from recovering any damages for breach of contract against Frow. Furthermore, Justice Field noted that even if no fraud had occurred in this instance, allowing recovery would still be an injustice since it would encourage parties to enter into contracts without due consideration for their obligations and consequences. As such, he concluded that the judgment should have been reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss De La Vega’s complaint against Frow entirely.