The U.S. Supreme Court case of John Francis Fry v. Cheryl K. Pliler, Warden in 2006 revolved around the issue of habeas corpus petitions and procedural default rules under federal law. The petitioner, Fry, a California state prisoner convicted for murder and robbery, had failed to object timely to a magistrate judge's report recommending denial of his petition during district court proceedings which led to an automatic waiver of any objections he might have had according to Ninth Circuit precedent (the “procedural default rule”). However, the Supreme Court held that this rule was not an "adequate" ground on which to deny hearing Fry’s claims because it was not strictly or regularly followed by the Ninth Circuit at relevant times. Therefore, they ruled that when a habeas petitioner fails to properly object in District Courts but raises issues for first time before Federal Appeals courts - these should be reviewed de novo (from scratch), rather than being automatically dismissed due their late presentation.

In the dissenting opinion for Fry v. Pliler, Justice Souter argued that the majority's decision to uphold a lower court ruling denying habeas corpus relief was incorrect because it failed to consider whether or not the error had substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict. He believed that even though Fry did not object at trial, he should still be able to challenge his conviction based on an alleged constitutional violation if he can show that it resulted in actual prejudice. In this case, Justice Souter felt there was enough evidence of potential bias from one juror who knew about Fry’s prior criminal record which could have influenced her judgment and thus affected the outcome of his trial. Therefore, according to him, failing to inquire into possible prejudice constituted a clear violation of due process rights under U.S Constitution.