In the 1930 case of Fullerton Lumber Company v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the railroad company. The dispute arose when Fullerton Lumber claimed that it was charged excessive rates for freight by the railroad company and sought reparations under Section 8 of the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA). However, during litigation it was revealed that these charges were not higher than those set by tariffs filed with and approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), as required by law. Therefore, despite any perceived unfairness or excessiveness in pricing on part of Fullerton Lumber Co., they had no legal basis to claim reparations since all procedures followed were within regulatory compliance according to ICA provisions upheld by ICC standards.

In the dissenting opinion for Fullerton Lumber Company v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company, Justice Stone argued that the majority's decision was inconsistent with previous rulings of the Court and failed to consider relevant factors in determining whether a party has been injured by an alleged violation of antitrust laws. He contended that it is not necessary for a plaintiff to show actual harm or damage as a result of anti-competitive conduct; rather, it is sufficient if they can demonstrate potential harm or threat due to such behavior. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority's view that only direct competitors could be victims under antitrust laws and maintained that any person who may suffer injury because of prohibited practices should have standing to sue. In his view, this would include indirect purchasers like Fullerton Lumber Company who are affected by price-fixing schemes between suppliers and their direct customers.