In the case of Gableman v. Peoria, Decatur and Evansville Railway Company (1900), the U.S Supreme Court ruled in favor of the railway company. The plaintiff, Gableman, was a passenger on one of the defendant's trains when it derailed due to a defective rail which had been previously inspected but not repaired by an employee who failed to report its condition. As a result of this accident, Gableman suffered injuries and sued for damages based on negligence. The court held that while there may have been negligence on part of individual employees in failing to repair or report about the faulty rail track; however, such negligence could not be attributed directly to their employer i.e., Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Railway Co., as per existing laws at that time. Therefore, it concluded that under common law principles applicable then - employers were only liable for actions performed within scope and course of employment - hence no liability could be imposed upon them unless they had direct knowledge or involvement in negligent acts leading up-to accidents causing harm. This ruling highlighted how legal interpretations around vicarious liability evolved over time with courts initially requiring more direct links between employers' actions/inactions and resulting harms before holding them accountable for employees' negligent acts during work hours/tasks.

The dissenting opinion in the case of Gableman v. Peoria, Decatur and Evansville Railway Company argued that the majority's decision was inconsistent with previous rulings regarding railway companies' liability for damages caused by their employees. The dissent contended that a company should be held responsible if an employee, while acting within the scope of his duties, causes harm to another person or property due to negligence or recklessness. In this particular case, it was argued that the railway company should be liable for damages because its employee had acted negligently when he left a switch open on a track which led to Mr. Gableman’s injury. The dissent further criticized the majority's interpretation of "scope of employment," arguing it too narrowly defined what actions could be considered as such and thus limited corporate accountability unfairly.