In the 1972 case of GACA v. United States, the U.S Supreme Court dealt with a dispute over whether or not an individual could be deported for committing a crime that was considered to be "a crime involving moral turpitude" under immigration law. The petitioner, Gaca, was a Polish immigrant who had been convicted of burglary in Illinois and sentenced to probation. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) sought his deportation on grounds that he committed a crime involving moral turpitude within five years after entry into the US and received imprisonment sentence for one year or longer. However, Gaca argued that since he only received probation rather than actual imprisonment time, his offense should not qualify as such under immigration law. The Supreme Court ruled against Gaca stating that even though he did not serve jail time but got probation instead; it still constituted as receiving an imprisonment sentence because if violated terms of probation then would have served prison term which is more than one year long thus making him deportable according to existing laws at the time.

In the dissenting opinion for GACA v. United States, the justice argued that the majority's decision to uphold a conviction based on evidence obtained from an unauthorized wiretap was in violation of Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. The justice contended that allowing such evidence would set a dangerous precedent, effectively endorsing government intrusion into private communications without proper authorization or oversight. Furthermore, they asserted that this ruling undermined citizens' trust in their right to privacy and could potentially lead to abuses of power by law enforcement agencies. They also disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act as permitting such wiretaps; instead arguing it should be read as reinforcing existing constitutional safeguards rather than undermining them.