In the 1931 case of Galveston Wharf Co. et al. v. Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Co. et al., the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a railway company had rights to wharf property in Texas under an 1854 charter from the State Legislature and subsequent amendments thereto, despite changes in ownership over time due to bankruptcy proceedings and corporate restructuring. The court held that while such charters can confer special privileges or immunities on corporations, they do not create irrevocable contracts immune from legislative control unless explicitly stated otherwise within the terms of the charter itself or its amendments; no such language existed here so there were no vested rights for successors or assigns of original grantees beyond those expressly granted by statute at any given time.

The dissenting opinion in the case of Galveston Wharf Co. et al. v. Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Co. et al., argued that the majority's decision was flawed because it failed to consider key aspects of property rights and contractual obligations between parties involved in a lease agreement for wharf facilities at the Port of Galveston, Texas. The dissent emphasized that under common law principles, a lessee who makes improvements on leased land is entitled to compensation from lessor upon termination or expiration of the lease if such terms were stipulated in their contract; however, this principle was not applied by the majority when they ruled against railway companies' claim for reimbursement from wharf company after making substantial investments on its properties during their tenancy period based on an understanding derived from previous dealings with them which suggested they would be compensated later for these expenditures as per industry practice then prevalent among port authorities and railroads across country.